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The phenomena we discuss encompass examples of plausibly bounded application of non-linguistic constraint to linguistic decision. Indeed, there is controversy about whether some examples should be dealt with within syntax or in some "pragmatic" way. Thinking about these problems invites an experimental pragmatics that usefully broadens basic psycholinguistic processing theory. A variety of related phenomena identifiable from early to recent studies can be linked to pragmatic theory at several points. We will take note of these in following sections.
A. Understood Elements of Content
The idea that there are "understood" elements of content associated with sentences (and fragments of sentences) has been an important part of linguistic theory since at least the early work in transformational grammar. We look briefly at some examples of these and their treatment over the ensuing years.
Syntactic Ellipsis Famously (and notoriously), early transformational grammars posited a variety of operations that removed surface pronounceable aspects of underlying 1 (syntactically categorized and semantically interpreted) material on condition of "recoverability".
2 Many of these went under the label of "syntactic" ellipsis, and the operations had labels such as:
(Gapping) Mary hit the hay and John the bottle. (VP Deletion) The man who didn't leave saw the man who did. (Comparative Deletion) Mary found more counterexamples than John (found). (PP Deletion) Mary is at the door and Betty is too (Subject-Verb Gapping) John ate dinner last night, and breakfast this morning. (Sluicing) Mary is at the door and I wonder why. (Stripping) Mary likes to surf but not Betty 4
Pragmatic Ellipsis The syntactically motivated cases contrast with "pragmatic" ellipsis. Here, information is understood not because it is in the sentence and not pronounced, but because it can be assigned a place in the sentence from context; i.e., immediate context can fill out the content.
Sometimes this is verbal:
Do you ski? Yes (I ski) Sometimes it is situational or perceptual:
We both notice Hulk Hogan entering the room: (That guy is) Big! 4
NP-trace: The storyi was fabricated e/t i by the re-election committee, The re-electioni committee seems e/t i to have fabricated the evidence Wh-trace: Who i does Mary think I like e/t i ?
And, at least one element (in English) does not involve simply being an unspoken occurrence, but is unspoken simpliciter:
PRO: PRO to vote for Bush is PRO to vote for war. In GB theory, these null elements have different linguistic properties 10 , but share the property that they are not pronounced at all (PRO), or not pronounced at the "null" occurrence(s).
Argument Structure Finally, both early transformational grammar and more recent versions have a lexicon as a (or the) repository of idiosyncratic, unsystematic elements in the language, and this seems to include the number and nature of arguments of e.g. a verb 11 , which in English (and perhaps other languages) can range from one to three: 12
(intransitive): to sneeze (Sx) 2 (transitive): to hit (Hxy) 3 (ditransitive): to give (Gxyz)
In GB theory, argument places are associated with two other pieces of information: (i) their subcategorization, and (ii) their thematic or theta roles. There is wide variation how this information is represented. For instance subcategorization can be represented: 13 
smile: verb, 1-NP kill: verb, 1-NP 2-NP give: verb, 1-NP 2-NP/PP 3-NP
And theta structure can be represented in a thematic (or theta) "grid" (we collapse the grid --the subscripts should be under the NPs):
kill: verb AGENT-NPi PATIENT-NPj Sometimes the information is merged (where angles indicate subcategorization, and underlining indicates external argument or subject): 14 smile: V, (Agent) kill: V <NP>, (Agent, Theme) give : V, <NP, PP>, (Agent, Theme, Goal) It has been argued (Perry (1986) , et al) that some verbs surface as one-place syntactic relations, but are 10 In general, a wh-trace is [-a, -p] , and a NP-trace is [+a, -p] , PRO is [+a, +p] . Here +a = anaphor and so is governed by principle A of Binding Theory (bound in its Governing Category), and +p = pronominal and so is governed by principle B of Binding Theory (free in its Governing Category). PRO, having contradictory properties if having a Governing Category, consequently has no Governing Category in GB theory. 11 We leave the question of the number and nature of arguments for adjective, prepositions and nouns open. 12 See Jackendoff (1987) and Dowty (1991) for discussions of thematic relations in general, not just in GB theory. 13 See Haegeman (1991, chapter 3) for a discussion of argument structure in GB theory.
14 See Sells (1985) .
semantically two-place relations:
It
is raining (R(t,p))
It has also been noted (Bach (2001, 5.4) , Recanati (2004, 98-99) ) that some verbs with very similar meanings, at least on a reading, and hence presumably very similar underlying argument structure, have different surface argument structure 15 (* = ungrammatical, @ = grammatical, but not the right content, and parentheses mark understood content): 16 finished (Fx,y) : John finished the novel, John finished (something) vs completed (Cx,y) : John completed the novel, John completed (*0, something) eat (Ex,y) : John ate dinner, John ate (something) vs hear (Hx,y) : John heard the car, John heard (@something, something from context) attempt (Ax,y) : John tried three times vs *John attempted three times Such argument structure is a potential source for understood elements of content.
Overall, we have numerous sources of understood elements of content (UECs) --elements that (i) are associated with specific locations in sentence structure, and (ii) are not pronounced or written. Some UEC are "understood" occurrences (syntactic ellipsis, movement: NP, Wh traces) where the missing material can be linked to the content of (other) overt material in the sentence. Call these cases "Linked" UECs. Still others are understood simpliciter, and their content cannot be traced to other overt material. Call these "Unlinked" or "Free" UECs. Free UECs can be associated with the underlying structure of the sentence (PRO, argument structure), or can supplement overt material that is fragmentary to make a whole content (pragmatic ellipsis).
17 Against this background of linguistically oriented cases, we turn to pragmatics and to recently emphasized types of understood content that go under a variety of labels. Part of the challenge is to uncover the nature of the data, as well as in the mechanisms proposed to account for them. It is an open question to what extent these data are distinct from the free UECs just surveyed.
15 This appears to conflict with intuitions that argument structure and thematic roles are semantically determined. For instance Haegeman (1991, 35) "Whether a verb is transitive or not is not a matter of mere chance; it follows from the type of action or state expressed by the verb, from the meaning". 16 And perhaps: John put it on the table (*John put it) vs John set it down on the table (John set it down). 17 We leave open the question of "whole" contents --i.e. whether they are or must be complete propositions, or whether they can be "propositional functions" --contents that become propositions when supplemented. A problem with this idea is that any bit of content is a propositional function in the sense that a proposition could be built out of it. Frege (who spoke of "concepts") and Russell (from whom we get the above term) solved this problem by tying the notion to predication.
B. Implicature and Impliciture: Pure Pragmatics
Recent pragmatics has uncovered a category of content that is putatively non-Gricean, i.e. is not a part of the meaning of the sentence, is not a part of what Grice would have called what is said, and is not a part of what is traditionally considered a (particularized) conversational implicature. 18 We will steal a term from and call this class of understood elements of content 'implicitures'. We will represent this information in square brackets. This content, or the process of providing it, has various labels: 'default heuristic', 'unarticulated constituent', 'explicature', and 'impliciture'. This variety suggests a family of conceptually distinct but overlapping phenomena, though the relations among them have not been sorted out. Indeed, as we will see, there is good reason to distinguish subtypes among these examples.
Here is a brief review of the main categories of, and/or mechanisms of providing, information that is communicated, but (i) it is not said, and (ii) it is not a particularized conversational implicature (i.e involving the flouting and exploitation of a maxim). Grice (1975) introduced generalized conversational implicature (GCIs) to mark off a class of implicatures with the distinctive feature that uttering the expression involved would "normally" carry the implicature, unlike "particularized" conversational implicatures that require special circumstances to be understood: Sperber and Wilson (1986) introduced the term 'explicature' for similar phenomena (see also Carston, 1988 Carston, , 2002 and proposed that they be explained with mechanisms of enrichment (spelled out in terms of relevance theory): Recanati (1989 Recanati ( , 1993 Recanati ( , 2004 agreed with most of this data, but introduced some of his own terminology. He distinguished between what he called (i) "primary" pragmatic processes, devoted either to building a proposition from a non-proposition using procedures of "saturation" or building an enriched proposition using procedures of "strengthening", "loosening, and "metonymical (semantic) transfer", and (ii) "secondary" pragmatic processes, mostly devoted to traditional conversational implicature. also agreed with much of the above data and added some of his own. He distinguished between "completion" implicitures (similar to saturation), and "expansion" implicitures. Unlike Sperber and Wilson, Carston and Recanati, Bach follows Grice in holding to a narrow, strict construal of what is said, one in which the words, their order and grammatical construction must be respected. Levinson (1995 Levinson ( , 2000 , adapting Grice's category of (GCIs), proposed that communication is governed by a small number of shared "Default Heuristics" that allow a speaker to compress, and the hearer to correspondingly expand, a message in the face of articulatory restrictions, "a significant bottleneck" in the human vocal-auditory channel:
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'Some [not all] of the students failed the exam' (Q-Heuristic) 'He opened the door' [in the normal way] (I-Heuristic) 'Ann turned the key and [thereby intentionally] started the engine'. (I-Heuristic) 'He turned the handle and pushed open the door' [did not open the door in the normal
way] (M-Heuristic) We will later return in more detail to Levinson's distinctions and to phenomena treated in terms of Q and I heuristics.
Looking across the spectrum of impliciture examples, we find numerous controversies regarding these contents. Are they semantic or pragmatic? Are they really not a part of what is said, nor a part of what is implicated? Are they linguistically represented or not? Are they subject to compositional mechanisms? Is the information recovered during sentence comprehension or after sentence comprehension? And what are the mechanisms that provide this information during comprehension? These questions have been difficult to convincingly resolve using only the methods of intuition and argument. The experimental methodology of psycholinguistics, to which we now turn, provides complementary observations that suggest answers to some of these questions and in particular, indicates significant processing differences among impliciture phenomena 8
C. Experimental Pragmatics: Studies of Impliciture Phenomena
We review two classes of experimental work on understood elements of content. These have lessons for which modes of experimental enquiry are likely to be informative and some preliminary conclusions about the language processing systems that account for implicitures. Our discussion divides semi-historically into two parts. In the first part, we look at experimental tests of subjects' categorization of utterance contents as a part of what is "said" vs implicatures and implicitures. Can distinctions developed in pragmatic theory be elicited from naive language users in categorization tasks? This is a species of "psychological reality" question that used a mixture of metalinguistic judgments and intuitions about sentence and speaker meaning. The outcomes are not compelling with regard to such judgments as vehicles for investigating and clarifying impliciture phenomena. These methods do not seem to hold the potential for advances over pure pragmatic approaches --though the sentence types in focus formed the foundation for the studies we discuss in the second part of our review. In that second part, we discuss a different class of experiments centered on mechanisms for the recovery of implicatures and implicitures during language comprehension tasks. These raise essential questions about pragmatic processing that parallel longstanding concerns in the psycholinguistic study of sentence comprehension. The available experimental outcomes argue for significant processing differences between two subclasses of implicitures. These differences suggest multifaceted links between pragmatic processing and basic sentence processing. Grice (1975 ) famously distinguished what is said from what is implicated, within "the total signification of an utterance". Subsequent work in (pure) pragmatics has foundered somewhat on competing criteria and intuitions for drawing this distinction.
Categorization: What is Said vs What is Implicated
22 Recanati (1989) 'normal interpreters'). (2004, 20) . Although this is only a necessary condition, it is tempting to strengthen it to a sufficient condition as well. Doing so suggests that if 'normal' interpreters think something is said, it is said. Going further down this path, one might suppose that we could discover what is said by surveying what normal interpreters think is said when presented with various utterances. And, if what is said is controversial, then perhaps such results might adjudicate the disputes. early on questioned this idea, noting that normal speakers might conflate extraneous pragmatic information with intrinsic semantic information. Relying on normal interpreters to identify what is said would have to be a circumspect affair that would involve giving them not only controversial cases, but structurally similar cases that 22 There is no evidence for the claim that, for Grice, what is implicated is distinctive for the maxims of conversation. 23 He also puts it as the 'Availability Principle': "'what is said' must be analyzed in conformity to the intuitions shared by those who fully understand the utterance --typically the speaker and the hearer, in a normal conversational setting." (2004, 14) are not controversial, as well as contexts in which the implicit material is canceled.
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The first experimental study of the categorization by ordinary speakers of what is "said" vs what is "implicated" was Gibbs and Moise (1997) . Their experiments were examined and repeated in later work by Nicolle and Clark (1999) and again, by Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002) . The three sets of experiments are thus closely matched and afford interesting comparisons that test the idea immanent in the availability principle. The Gibbs and Moise (1997) Enriched The old king died of a heart attack and then a republic was declared
The outcome was that the enriched interpretation was strongly preferred (84%). Minimal interpretation was not favored in any condition. Experiment 2 attempted a more stringent test. G&M changed the instructions to briefly tutor subjects in the minimal-expanded distinction and then repeated experiment I. The results were similar: the more explicit instructions had little effect. For our purposes, the striking outcome is that subjects felt free to add substantial amounts of distinct conceptual material in the paraphrase and claim that it was 'what was said'. The instructions seemed open to very broad interpretation.
Experiment 3 manipulated context. Test sentences were preceded by a story biasing for an implicature. Subjects made a forced choice between the E-interpretation and a contextually appropriate implicature:
Bill wanted to date his co-worker Jane. But Bill really didn't know much about her. Being a bit shy, he first talked to another person, Fred. Fred knew Jane fairly well. Bill wondered if Jane was single. Fred replied: 'Jane has three children'
(a) Implicature Jane is married (b) Enriched Jane has exactly three children Even in such contexts, subjects continued to favor the enriched interpretation (86%) over the implicature. This suggests a strong bias for impliciture that we will see other evidence for later.
Experiment 4 changed the context manipulation to favor the minimal interpretations (these were non-preferred interpretations in experiments 1 and 2. For example:
A boy scout troop was doing its civic service by cleaning up the park in the middle of town. The park was a mess and the scouts needed many rakes and shovels to do the job. One scout noted that there weren't enough rakes for everyone and said that two more were needed. The scout master told him to go to the hardware store and ask for Ralph. The master said to the scout: 'Ralph has two rakes' (a) Enriched Ralph has exactly two rakes (b) Minimal: Ralph has at least two rakes. Subject preferences now reversed: the contextually supported minimal interpretations were strongly preferred (90%). So, suitable context did defeat the impliciture.
These outcomes showed that an "enriched" interpretation was preferred when test sentences (related to Grice's GCIs) were presented without context. The preference was not affected by instruction or training towards the minimal interpretation, and, surprisingly, it was preferred even in contexts geared to PCIs. But, it could be overridden in favor of minimal interpretations in suitable contexts. So instruction of the sort used by G&M did not affect judgments, but context did, and powerfully. This is an important thread that runs through the experiments we discuss here. Nicolle and Clark (1999) reviewed and criticized aspects of G&M's experiments 1 and 2, (mostly regarding stimulus materials). They then presented three experiments of their own. The first experiment is of particular interest to us. It was based on G&M experiment 3. In N&C's experiment 1, subjects were given a story context, with a target sentence at the end and two paraphrase choices:
An The outcome was similar to G&M's. There was no effect of instruction. Subjects seemed indifferent to the variations, as if 'saying', 'meaning', and 'communicating' were virtually interchangeable. But, another result differed from G&M's in an interesting way. This was the effect of contextually driven preferences. N&C's contexts yielded a preference for the implicature rather than the enriched interpretation. Context design in the two studies produced different preference ranking. Whatever account may be offered for this, it is abundantly clear that contextual constraint is highly labile, and that fact must be systematically addressed in any experimentation. The work next discussed does so.
Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002) presented a modified replication of the N&C experiments. Sentences represented the five categories from G&M's original study, with one added type: 'perfectives' (e.g.,"I've had breakfast" --see section B). B&C ran a norming test (experiment 1) to establish a range of subject responses to the target sentences. Subjects generated short lists of things a speaker might have been trying to communicate (re the context situations). From the lists, B&C derived a set of forced choice alternatives that distilled the most frequent notions in the data set. Then, they tested effects of instruction on distinguishing among the alternatives. They tested the same three instructional conditions as N&C did. The five response categories appear below. Instructional variation had no impact. The results differed only in minor ways across the conditions. Values averaged across the three conditions were: Minimal: Brain has at least three cats 6.3% Explicature: Brian has exactly three cats 23.55% Strong implicature: Jane should stay with Paul 38.43% Weak implicature: Brian likes cats 9.17% Implicated premise: Brian's cats will cause Jane to have an allergic reaction 22.56%
The finding of no effect of instruction matched previous results. But, the outcome was even more complex --there was not even a strong dominant response. Clearly, the instructions were not understood in a uniform way. Responses were spread fairly evenly across the three most frequent response types. As a group, the subjects did not distinguish what was said, communicated or what the words meant. For example, subjects given 'Brain has three cats' in the above story context, did not reliably identify 'Jane should stay with Paul' as distinct re what was said, communicated or as the meaning of the sentence. Notice that this sentence shares not a single word-concept with the original. Similarly, for 'Brian's cats will cause Jane to have an allergic reaction,' -and this sentence shares only a single word-concept ('Brian') with the original. The instructions seem roughly equivalent for very different responses.
How did subjects evaluate the test sentence 'Brian has three cats.'? Several interpretive options were viable, as demonstrated by the fact that the test scenarios displayed a robust division of preferences. But, keep in mind: subjects introspected about their understanding of the test sentences and the contexts. Thus, factors beyond those derivable directly from the target materials were in play (e.g., strategic decision and subject's understanding of the task). Moreover, their choices might well have been made at the point where the procedure called for a response, and not at the stage of initial comprehension. Presuppositions and pragmatic possibilities were explicitly presented in the option set, and choice among them driven by a subject's judgment of what the experimenter wanted or needed to hear. One needs an earlier window into the process if initial comprehension is the target.
In summary, the three experiments yielded similar results: naive subjects are insensitive to distinctions regarding what is said, what words mean, and what is communicated. The ordinary use of 'say' seems so flexible as to be virtually useless in theorizing. 'Availability' tested in this way is not a promising diagnostic. But, this indifference to instructions did not carry over to contextual influences. All three papers reported success in steering subjects to minimal or enriched interpretations by manipulating the context. That is our next focus. In particular, the objective is to determine whether there is, in fact, a uniformity of mental processes associated with pragmatic interpretation in context. Some models of processing deny this, treating every interpretation as "unique" because of interaction with context. Others postulate some commonalities across interpretive responses that accommodate context.
Mechanisms and Processes: What is Said vs What is Implicated
We begin with continued attention to Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002) . They turned their efforts to processing issues in the final two experiments of that report (experiments 3 and 4). Recall that although minimal interpretations were clearly not favored in preference data for any of the experiments we reviewed, they were readily elicited by suitable context. B&C posed this general 13 question re contextually driven interpretations: Is there a necessary stage in pragmatic processing at which a minimal proposition is recovered? This question requires measures sensitive to the time course of the mental processes that lead to a preference. B&C identified three processing models from the literature for test. B&C's experiment 3 evaluated new materials to represent the six categories in their experiment 2. Test sentences were paired with two kinds of stories. One biased towards an enriched interpretation, and the other towards a minimal interpretation. Subjects made a forced choice between minimal and enriched paraphrases that followed the paragraphs. The results showed effective contextual bias (~86% contextual compliance). These materials were used to test processing issues in experiment 4.
Experiment 4 used the 24 best context/sentence pairs from experiment 3. Subjects controlled presentation of the materials by a button press to advance line by line through the paragraph. The last sentence of the sequence was the test sentence. Then a mask of X's appeared, followed by a sentence in capital letters. Subjects had to judge whether the capitalized sentence was or was not a word for word match to the just preceding test sentence. For experimental items, the capitalized sentence expressed the (Gricean) minimal proposition; it did NOT physically match the last sentence in the story. Thus the appropriate response for the matching task was always 'No' on experimental items. (Fillers with 'Yes' responses were included on non-experimental items). The two measurements were reading time on the last sentence of the paragraph and the matching task decision times. The entire task as seen from the participants perspective had the virtue of emphasizing attention to the interpretation of the impliciture.
No significant context effect for match-mismatch judgment times was found and we set that measure aside in our discussion 27 . However, reading times for the impliciture did show context effects: The time to read the final sentence (underlined in the example above) in the minimal vs enriched contexts is a measure of processing time for the impliciture sentences. LFS predicts longer reading times for target sentences in enriched contexts because it assumes that the minimal proposition must first be constructed, then rejected. RP predicts the opposite because it assumes enriched interpretations are more "accessible". So, no conflict arises in enriched contexts, but in minimal contexts the minimal interpretation must compete with and override the enriched interpretation. LPP models predict no difference since context is assumed to be decisive and hence no interference should arise. The B&C results showed longer final sentence reading times in minimal contexts compared to enriched contexts. That pattern disconfirmed LFS and LPP predictions. The RP Model account of the slower reading times in minimal contexts is that both minimal and enriched interpretations are always computed. Thus, for contexts that demand a minimal interpretation, the (preferred) enriched interpretation must be overridden. In our terminology, the impliciture must be defeated. We will return to this and other models that give priority to enriched interpretation after considering some other experimental findings that promote a rather different picture. A paramount feature of this additional work is its focus on one subclass of the impliciture materials. Bezuidenhout and Morris (2004) narrowed attention to just one of the types in the B&C study. These were "scalar implicatures" (e.g., the cardinals and scalars in B&C's stimuli given earlier). However, the scalar terms in this case were, in fact, not those in B&C. Instead, the implicature [Some X VP] => [not all X VP] was tested using a new method: eye movements during reading.
B&M evaluated two models designed to account for the processing of scalars:
( Levinson's Q heuristic.) (UM) Underspecification Model: Such expressions are semantically underspecified, and must be enriched in the specific context, and this arises from local pragmatic processes. These are not processing models in the same sense as the B&C proposals. Additional assumptions are needed for predictions about processing stages, time, resources, and errors. The models differ mainly in the semantic representations assumed to induce scalar GCIs. B&M used an eye movement measure during reading of test materials. Fixation patterns and gaze durations during reading were assumed to be sensitive to "the process of generating inferences". We return to this. Subjects were given sentences such as example (13) 'Not all N' should be triggered automatically by 'Some N', but not by 'The N'. Cancellation of the implicature should therefore increase processing time in the 'them did' region for the 'Some N' conditions compared to the 'The N' condition. 28 2. DM would also suggest indications of reanalysis, such as increased processing time that spills over onto the following region of the sentence, or regressions to the initial determiner phrase. 3. UM assumes that readers in the 'Some N' condition do not immediately commit to the some but not all reading. They engage in incremental processing utilizing whatever information is available at any given moment. The word 'all' was assumed to bias towards the some and possibly all interpretation. B&M assumed that this would lead to increased processing time due to assimilation of information relevant to specification of an underspecified item. The specification process is assumed to use resources to integrate new information and hence has a processing cost.
Several results for target regions in the sentences are relevant. Readers did spend significantly more initial processing time (as measured by gaze duration) on the word 'all' following 'Some N' than following 'The N'. This fits UM assumptions. Further, although DM suggests increased processing effort following cancellation in the 'of them did' region, there was no evidence of this. Conditions did not differ for time spent in the end of sentence region or rereading the initial 'Det N' region. This is consistent with the UM assumption that the specification is made incrementally as relevant information accrues, and there is no need for reanalysis. From these and other features of the experiment, B&M concluded that overall, UM best fitted the results.
Indeed, this study represents significant real-time processing questions, and the measure used can support quite detailed time dependent claims. But, the eye movement and fixation patterns that are possible in such circumstances are complex and interact with presumptive information processing in several ways. These factors raise significant problems for the conclusion that the data invalidate DM and support UM. Both theoretical assumptions and experimental methods are at issue.
First, the analysis of 'reprocessing loads' versus 'integration loads' in processing is problematic. Reprocessing accounts provide reasonably clear grounds for claims about changed levels of processing difficulty, but the notion of 'integration load' is much vaguer. This is acute for the theoretical perspective that B&M describe in which there is continuous incremental integration of contextual information into the interpretation. The theory is in need of sharper specification of what constitutes an 'integration discontinuity' or some metric for systematic variation that is not ad hoc.
Relevance theory lacks such a metric. Why, in particular, is the integration of new information prominent at the occurrence of the quantifier 'all' rather than at the phrasal integration of 'all of them'?
Why not at the verb 'did'? Many parsing theories postulate integrative 'wrap up' processes triggered by end of sentence/clause. It is unclear how to address or discount such from the perspective B&M associated with UM.
More telling, however, are difficulties with the stimuli and the eye movement patterns. The assumption that the default heuristic must await the remainder of the 'of them did' phrase has two difficulties. One a possible ellipsis analysis and the other is potential parafoveal information. Intuitively, an ellipsis analysis of the sentences at the occurrence of 'all' is defensible as a reflex of the hedge phrases that introduced the quantifier phrase. So: 'Some books had colored pictures. In fact, all --which is why the teachers like them'. The prosodic contour for 'all' would be different from the target one for B&M's sentence, but in a reading task, the elliptical expression is quite acceptable. From this perspective, both UM and DM predict an analysis peak at the quantifier. In addition, there is the matter of parafoveal effects. There is good reason to suppose that fixations in the latter portion of the hedge phrase region just prior to 'all' would pick up information about the 'all' phrase, and similarly so for those fixations landing on the quantifier itself. That information includes word identity and interpretative constraint (Murray, 2000) . The combination of an elliptical analysis of the expression, plus the availability of parafoveal information, compromises the contrast of the theories. B&M's study, while suggestive, does not provide strong grounds for decision.
Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006) examined GCI and also focused on scalar implicatures as their vehicle of investigation. They compared two pragmatic views of how speaker meaning is achieved. One was the 'default' view (Levinson, 2000) , and hence corresponds to DM in the B&C work. The other they described as the 'context driven view' (Sperber and Wilson 1986) . The context driven view assigns GCI no special status and holds that they are drawn only where called for by the specific context and is in this respect similar in spirit to the UM view pursued by B&M.
On the assumption (noted of B&M earlier) that more inference demands more processing time, the context driven view predicts more processing in contexts for which an implicature must be made. The canceling ('lower bound' in their terms) context is a free ride on this view -no implicature is made. By contrast, they note that the default view of scalars must call for more processing in the canceling context since the default will be made and must be overridden. BK&W cite the B&C experiments as a case of the latter outcome since it showed longer response times for the minimal reading (canceling implicatures) and hence does not fit the predictions they sketched for the context driven models. Commenting on the B&C work, BK&W observe that "nearly half the materials" used by B&C were not "unequivocably implicature triggers," (p. 13). In particular, they question whether the use of cardinals involves an implicature. They also critiqued the quantified NP ('everyone came to the party') case and reject it as suitable for test of GCI. BK&W then report two experiments designed to address issues of processing for scalars.
The first was described as a 'replication' of B&C's experiment, but using materials that avoid the problems they identified in their critique. They choose a case they deemed a relevant implicature: the [A or B] The subjects who participated in the experiment were "native speakers of Greek studying at Cambridge." Materials were presented in Greek (see experiment 2 below for reasons associated with the choice of test population). They compared reading times for contexts that biased for the implicature and a context that cancelled it.
Results showed longer reading times for the enabling context cases -i.e., those that required the [A or B] implicature. In B&C terms, these would be the enriched instances rather than the minimal. So, results for [A or B] (which was not tested by B&C it should be remembered) were the reverse of B&C's outcome. This reinforces the BK&W's position on the analysis of scalars and their processing. We will return later to issues of the differences between the B&C outcomes and those of BKW.
With regard to the 'some X' construction, BK&W stress the importance of testing in a neutral context in order to evaluate the default view. Default assumptions say that the implicature will be computed in a neutral environment because it is triggered by the scalar term. On a single process account (which assumes the implicature must be triggered by context), the scalar will not yield an implicature. Here BK&W raise an important issue regarding neutral contexts. This is the influence of topic/non-topic differences. They argued that topic effects in English preclude a neutral test of the 'some X' construction in isolated sentences (presented 'out of the blue' in their terms). Such presentation triggers contrastive assumptions and leads to the implicature. Hence they argue, 'context free' presentation for this kind of case isn't really context free in the relevant sense.
BK&W's second experiment was an elegant test of the 'some X' construction that was designed to avoid the topicalization issues and to test processing of scalar implicitures in a neutral context. To deal with the topic confound, they tested Greek language stimuli with native Greek speakers. In Greek, reordering the elements of the construction avoids the topic effect. To control for order effects per se they used a design with explicit triggers ('only') as a control, e.g. The 'some x' phrase was sentence initial or sentence final, and thus a/b are topic versions, while c/d are non-topic versions. All versions of the test sequence were followed by a forcing phrase (e.g., 'the rest').
Relevant comparisons were between the explicit and implicit cases. Reading times for the forcing phrase ('the rest') showed an interaction: reading time for the non-topic implicit condition was longer than the reading time for the corresponding explicit condition; no difference between explicit and implicit triggers was observed for the topic position. This indicates that the implicature was made in topic position for both explicit and implicit triggers. But, in non-topic position, it was apparently not made 'on-line' -i.e. during the processing of the 'some of the X' phrase. It was made when the forcing phrase was encountered. On these grounds, the scalar implicature is context driven and not a default move -it is not driven by sentence form. (Note: the BK&W analysis applies to the B&M results modulo the comments on method we raised for the B&M reading measures. The experimental presentation in B&M makes the scalar move salient, and its cancellation would lead to the observed pattern.) Recent work by Huang & Snedeker (2006) provides another look at the processing of scalars and adds important evidence for the time course of processing associated with making the scalar inference. In this study, another measure of processing time was employed: timing and control of gaze direction for the referents of stimulus sentences. Subjects were seated before a display board that had pictures to which test sentences referred. Their gaze direction was video recorded and measured to establish where in the display space it was pointed and at what point in time vis a vis the heard sentence. There is a tight coupling of gaze and language processes. (This is sometimes called the 'visual world paradigm; see Eberhard, et al, 1995 , for discussion of this class of measurements for sentence processing).
The test sentences were locally ambiguous (vis a vis the reference space). So, listeners might hear variants as indicated in the example below:
"Point to the girl with [two, three, all, some] of the socks." Display pictures included a boy with two socks, a girl with two socks and a girl with three soccer balls. For quantifiers 'two', 'three' and 'all', decision was determinate at the quantifier. If semantic interpretation of quantifiers were immediate, there would be no need to await the phonetic disambiguation re socks and soccer balls. And, if the impliciture from 'some x' to 'not all x' were made immediately upon encounter with the quantifier (as postulated in the default model discussed for B&M), the picture of the girl with two socks would also be a uniquely determinate target (she had 'some but not all' of the socks). The soccer ball picture was ruled out because that girl had all the soccer balls. However, if the scalar impliciture were not made in the 'some' condition (either underspecified or semantically interpreted as 'some X and possibly all'), the instruction was disambiguated only at the phonetic divergence of 'socks' and 'soccer'.
The results showed a clear difference between quantifier conditions. Gaze converged on the appropriate targets within 400 milliseconds after quantifier onset for 'two', 'three', and 'all' conditions; the 'some' condition was delayed until about 800 milliseconds after onset. Note that this is still well before the phonetic disambiguation point. This pattern shows that the scalar inference was indeed made, but significantly later than the lexical semantic interpretation of the quantifiers. The pragmatic process was rapid and contextually appropriate but followed basic sentence interpretation.
Two points need emphasis re the BK&W and H&S studies. The H&S results do not challenge the context driven SI claim that BK&W draw from their own data. The H&S experimental context was obviously one in which the option for the scalar inference was salient. But, the H&S evidence does challenge the local pragmatic processing idea as sketched in B&C. That model treats impliciture phenomena as not distinguished from the first stage sentence interpretation process. H&S results do not fit that assumption.
We now turn to a broader question: What should be made of the different outcomes re BK&W and B&C? The [A or B] test and the [some X] cases are experiments with different types of materials that produce different patterns from those observed in B&C. BK&W comment on the cardinals and quantifier cases and set those aside as not satisfactory on their analysis re GCI. What then, should be the status of the perfective, possession, time distance and temporal relation cases in B&C? So far as we can tell, none of these produced a result like the one BK&W got for the scalars they tested. Indeed, it appears that all of the six types in B&C's work should be treated in a different way than the scalars as characterized by BK&W. It is here that we find it useful to draw attention to the distinction between two types of default inferences: the Q and I heuristics as discussed in Levinson (1995 Levinson ( , 2000 . The scalars are treated by Levinson in terms of the Q heuristic, whereas most of the types in B&C, we would argue, are more appropriately treated in terms of the I-heuristic. Thus, while both are species of defaults, they differ in important respects.
Levinson sees the Q-Heuristic as requiring appeal to the notion of a "contrast set" of alternative expressions differing in informativeness (modified Q-Heuristic): "For the relevant salient alternatives, what isn't said is not the case" (2000, 36) . Examples of such contrast sets of expressions would include the scalars we have just been discussing. Levinson (2000) proposed the I-Heuristic to deal with UEC examples we discussed earlier, and we consider that it applies to most of the examples like those in the B&C experiment 29 . Levinson's says of the I-Heuristic: "What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified" (2000: 37). If a remark is unqualified and uses undistinctive vocabulary, it refers to the stereotypical features of a situation. That stereotypic information need not be explicitly linguistically encoded. 30 If, as we suppose, the difference in the BK&W results and those in B&C resides in different mechanisms of processing associated with the two types of phenomena, further evidence bearing on the issue is needed. Garrett & Harnish (2007) is relevant. We reported an experiment that focused on impliciture types similar to those of B&C and bears directly on the issue of the potential contrast of these types with the processing profile typical of the scalar experiments. In addition, our experimental probe invoked a mechanism derived from Bach's proposals as contrast to the default account. Thus, we compared two mechanisms for providing understood elements of content: Bach's application of "standardization" to implicitures and the default mechanism of Levinson's I-Heuristic. used the term 'impliciture' to cover many of the cases of UEC we discussed earlier. These he construes as instances of not being explicit in what one says. Standardization provides access to the implicit content. By his assumption, that content could have been made explicit by adding words to the sentence. The experimental targets we used, shortly to be discussed, have this property. Standardization was first proposed in Bach and Harnish (1979, chapter 9) as the relation that certain sentence forms have to indirect illocutionary acts. These are uses that, though not a part of the sentence's literal and direct illocutionary potential, are nevertheless associated with the sentence form and do not have to be figured out de novo as non-standardized forms typically are. 31 Principal examples of standardized indirection are 'Can/could/would you VP?' (compare to: semantically similar forms 'Do you have the ability to VP?'). Standardization plausibly applies to nonliterality as well, such as familiar proverbs, metaphors and other figures of speech. To these cases, Bach would like to add some impliciture phenomena.
The I-Heuristic and standardization proposals may be applied to similar cases, and can raise distinguishable expectations about the processing of implicitures. They are, as they stand, not complete for that purpose. Indeed, they were not offered as processing solutions, but they can form the foundation of plausible processing schemas. Our working assumptions for Bach's standardization ideas and Levinson's I-heuristic are as follows.
Standardization: We have no decisive criterion for when a form is standardized. 32 We relied on generalizations from examples in the literature coupled with empirical assessment of preferences for interpretation. More, acutely, we cannot give an a priori account of the interaction of context and standardization. Suitable context may override (and/or suppress) the standardized interpretation: viz., it is present, but not contextually operative (like an irrelevant meaning). Or, a standardized interpretation may be suspended (and/or disabled) -not computed. Briefly: standardized (vs non-standardized) interpretation could be: (i) the most salient, (ii) less salient, (iii) overridden by context, or (iv) suspended by context. In the our experiment, we applied these working assumptions:
A1. Standardized interpretations are like meanings in that they "attach" to the type of form being uttered, and are retained in canceling contexts. A2. Standardized interpretations are more salient, preferred etc. A3. Standardized interpretations must be overridden by context when the (compositional) linguistic interpretation is favored.
The I-Heuristic: Implementation of this as a processing formula poses other questions. We have no criterion for being a 'simple' form and no criterion for the stereotypical information associated with a form. Again, we relied on generalization from literature examples and selected cases in which stereotypic and standardized information seemed to intersect. A key point concerns the relation of the I-Heuristic to background information: the default in the I-heuristic is to a set of stereotypic beliefs. Levinson remarks: "such a heuristic is extremely powerful --it allows an interpretation to bring all sorts of background knowledge about a domain to bear on a rich interpretation of a minimal description." (20002, 33) Clearly, this raises the most difficult of problems regarding the relation of general knowledge to linguistic knowledge and context. We comment on this in discussion. For purposes of our experiment, we assumed that information appealed to by the I-heuristic is part of general beliefs ("knowledge"), and that in the communication situation some of this information is either assumed or made mutual by the speaker. 33 Assumptions A4 and A5 summarize this. A4. Stereotypical information that heuristics allude to is a part of general background information we bring to most talk-exchanges. This is either (i) modified by contextual information, (ii) or modifies it.
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A5. Utterance interpretation takes place with ready access to such information. Important triggers for such information include specific lexical items and the evolving topic of discourse.
The Garrett and Harnish (2007) experiments with implicitures tested assumptions A1-A5 in two steps. The first was a context free materials validation and filtering step, and the second was a contextual constraint test. A set of 42 impliciture sentences was constructed: 14 each for three of the types discussed in section B: 'locative' ('It's raining.'), 'perfective' ('I've had breakfast.') and 'possession' ('I broke a finger.') We first tested whether these sentences actually had the expected behavioral effect. Subjects were presented with auditory versions (digital records presented by computer), followed by a visually presented question probing the presumed impliciture, e.g.:
Somebody said: 'It's raining' WHERE? HERE THERE Somebody said: 'I've had breakfast' WHEN? TODAY ONCE Somebody said: 'I broke a finger.' WHOSE? MINE SOMEONE'S Subjects answered the probe question by hitting a key to indicate a choice of one of the two indicated answers. The impliciture sentences were randomly mixed into a background set of other sentences of generally similar structure that lacked an impliciture (e.g.: Somebody said: 'It's my birthday,' Somebody said: 'I've won at poker,' Somebody said: 'She waved a flag.').
If an impliciture is computed, the choice and speed of choosing a compatible response should be fast 33 See Bach and Harnish (1979, chapter 1) for the notion and role of "mutual beliefs" in communication, and see Wilks and Bien (1983) for the idea of making a piece of information "mutual" as the need arises. Taylor (2001) also sees such background information as playing a decisive role, though he does not relate it to Levinson's heuristic, whereas Brennan (2003) does. 34 There might be a psychologically relevant distinction here between what Putnam (1975) calls stereotypical information about things or events (think also of frames and scripts), and what Searle (1978) calls the 'Background' --information we would rarely think to report, but is clearly at work during utterance interpretation. For now we will ignore this. and systematically biased as compared to non-impliciture sentences. The results confirmed the special status of the implicitures. Probe choices were in fact uniformly for the impliciture word following impliciture sentences (90% or more); the non-implicitures padding sentences were not similarly systematic. And, as might be expected, from such a choice bias result, response times to select an answer were also substantially and significantly faster following impliciture sentences than following non-implicitures. That pattern validated the stimulus construction effort and set the scene for the main experiment. The best eight examples (re bias and RT) of each of the three types were selected and used to test processing times required for contextual modification of the implicitures.
Experiment 2 used these materials, but they were visually presented using a self-paced reading paradigm to test for the effects of context. Enabling contexts (these supported the impliciture) were contrasted with canceling contexts (these defeated the impliciture and called for a nonstandardized meaning). Note that care was taken to insure that each context uniquely and strongly selected one of the two question probes. Off-line tests showed 95% or greater compliance with context.
On standardization assumptions A1-A3, we should observe priming for the related probes even in canceling contexts, since the standardized interpretation attaches to the form of words. On default heuristic assumptions A4-A5, we should observe priming for related probes only in enabling contexts, since stereotypical information is a part of background information and is only activated by the utterance in the context.
Reading time measures provided one kind of processing test. For the context passages leading up to the target sentence, reading times for enabling and canceling contexts give a rough index of the complexity of the contextual information. The average reading times for the two contexts were similar and did not differ statistically for enabling and cancelling contexts, suggesting comparable context complexity. Reading time for the target sentences was compared following each context type. A difference would be expected if reading time reflects integration time, and if the impliciture is available and interferes with integration. This is the pattern seen in the B&C study. In our study, there was some indication that it took longer to read the target sentence following the canceling contexts but the difference was not statistically significant.
The question answering task provided a second measure of context effects. Accuracy for contextually driven responses was very high for all sentence types, and was equally so for both canceling and supporting contexts. For question answering response times, the standardization and default accounts predict different outcomes. If context suppresses the impliciture, other things being equal, the two context types should not differ systematically. But, if the impliciture is invariably computed, this sets the stage for response competition and times for the canceling context should be longer than those for the enabling context. Results did reveal a substantial and statistically reliable difference between the contexts, with the enabling context being faster. This was true for all three of the types tested. However, though the question answering task indicated an interfering process was present, it leaves open the question of how close to the initial sentence processing that interfering process was engaged.
The upshot of the tests was that for the sorts of implicitures tested, the standardization hypothesis was supported over the default heuristic hypothesis as we framed it. It is important to bear in mind that the assumptions A4 and A5 with which we implemented the I-Heuristic may be the proper focus of the discomfirmation. Several things remain to be determined, including when precisely the impliciture is computed and how this pattern of results may generalize to different instances of impliciture phenomena. And, where this pattern holds up, we need to examine whether and how a default heuristic approach other than the one we chose might be construed so as conform to the experimental outcomes.
D. Some Conclusions
Overall, the studies of pragmatic processing reviewed here certainly pose problems for any version of "Gricean" ideas asserting that what is strictly said (or the minimal proposition associated with the utterance in the context) is processed first, before any "implicatures" are processed. That much seems secure. However, the positive picture is less clear. We need to draw some distinctions among the types of materials examined in the various experiments.
Setting aside the 'literal first' class of models, B&C 's (2002) sketch of processing compared what they characterized as a default ('ranked parallel') style model with a contextually driven model ('local pragmatic processing'). Their reading time measure showed easier processing of test sentences in contexts calling for the enriched interpretation of the sentences as compared to contexts calling for minimal interpretation. These were sentences representing the six test cases derived from the G&M and the N&C studies. The parallel processing model with preference ranking was deemed a better fit to this data than the local pragmatic processing model. Enriched interpretation was the preferred ('more salient'? more accessible'?) interpretation even in contexts favoring the minimal. It is perhaps well to keep in mind that a default interpretation of this pattern is not required (although B&C did link the RP model to Levinson as well as Gibbs) . Models that accord a stable preference for enriched interpretation, and hence for the impliciture in these cases, will suffice.
The investigations of scalars presented another vantage point on impliciture phenomena. B&M's (2004) experiment focused on one type (scalar implicitures) and used an eye-movement reading measure to provide evidence against a default style model of the sort proposed by Levinson. They argued in favor of an alternative model based on underspecification combined with contextually triggered elaboration (which they associated with relevance theory). If generalized to the other impliciture types, that perspective would rule out a preference for standardized interpretations in a context that favored a competing analysis, whether minimal or enriched in some way that goes beyond standardization. For a relevance theory based account, there is actually no difference between a minimal context and an enriched context. Both should be the direct determinant of the interpretive outcome and, other things being equal, should be attained with equal facility. Both the B&C results and our own militate against that view. The results of experiment thus support the view that contextual penetration of sentence interpretation should be distinguished from the interpretation that relies on sentence form --viz. the one achieved for standardized sentences when they are presented without overt context. So, we resist the generalization of the relevance model and its approach to the larger class of implicitures. But, the case for something like an underspecification approach to some members of the class, in particular, the scalars remains.
The work by BK&W indicates something more about the scalar implicitures. Default inferences were not made based solely on sentence form. The experimental demonstration that in a neutral context, the scalar implicature was not drawn is persuasive. In the topic condition that 'enabled' the implicit triggers, sentences with implicit and explicit impliciture triggers were processed similarly -they showed no hint of a difference. But, in the non-topic configuration that 'disabled' the implicit triggers, the scalar implicature was not drawn until the downstream position of the forcing phrase. This presses up against the intuitively powerful feelings that an English speaker has when confronted with context free examples of the 'some X' construction. BK&W's analysis of this in light of the confound with topic effects is salutary, and it illustrates once again, and powerfully, the need to combine the intuitive data base with the experimental data base in order to find our way through the brambles of linguistic, pragmatic, and psycholinguistic theory.
These issues are very helpfully illuminated by the study of H & S, which also focused on scalars and used a measurement technique that allowed a close look at the time course of the elaboration of sentence interpretation. The technique used was one that measures comprehension by gaze timing and direction for reference objects in free visual fields, and it showed unambiguous quantifier sentences were immediately interpreted whereas scalar implicatures with 'some', while indubitably on-line, were not immediate. They took extra time to develop. Here we see evidence that suggests the earlier assignment of interpretation based on the meanings of the lexical content of the sentence as compared to the elaboration of that interpretation by implicature -in this case, the rapid application of the scalar implicature.
To conclude, we may begin to explore ideas about what distinguishes processing proposals based on standardization as compared to that we formulated for the I-heuristic and what it may suggest about relations between Q and I phenomena. For the impliciture cases treated by standardization, we may hope to sidestep some of the problems that arise in recruiting on-line background knowledge to the interpretive task. That problem is acute. The "concentric circles" model 36 gives one working characterization of the problems this intersects. In this formulation, language forms the innermost circle 37 , contextual information forms the middle circle, and general background knowledge forms the third, outer circle, perhaps with information classed into kinds relevant for inferring that the speaker means one kind of thing rather than another.
38 Each of these "circles" raises problems. For instance both Chomsky (1986 Chomsky ( , 2000 and Davidson (1986) have questioned the everyday idea of a common language and its role in communication, but for different reasons. The second circle poses multiple problems of how contextual constraints are identified and recruited to the interpretive task. The third "circle" is the most pertinent to our contrast of standardization and the I-Heuristic. It raises the problem of the internal organization of general knowledge. Even if restricted to information relevant to the communicative force of the utterance, we can expect that "virtually any belief can play a role in the contextual determination (by the hearer) of the actual force of the utterance ... we can expect that the system of beliefs ... necessary to support communication will turn out to be almost as rich as our mental life in general"
39 . If such general knowledge is to be allocated to "central systems", then if Fodor (1983 Fodor ( , 2001 ) is right, there will likely be resistance to understanding such a structure by computational cognitive science. How is the relevant information to be accessed in a timely fashion? This seems to be nothing short of the "frame problem" applied to language understanding. 40 We do not have an answer to the specific problem, let alone the general one.
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For the case of implicitures, standardization offers a partial solution. It turns the processing operations into something very close to those that assign meaning to the utterance based on its form. It remains to be seen what more general formulation of a standardization account can be given. Indeed, there is some temptation to observe that the core of the I-heuristic idea has affinities with standardization, given its emphasis on stereotypic information and the notion of "a simple form". Standardization is driven by sentence form, and as we noted earlier, there is room to maneuver regarding the extent to which this is schematized. In formulating the experimental materials for the Garrett & Harnish experiment, we extended the examples from Bach and others by 'modeling' our constructive efforts on examples in the literature. It's a fair question -but one we will not try to answer--to ask what links those new exemplars to the original examples that inspired them.
Finally, we may ask what processing import we may associate with the differences in I and Q phenomena. The latter seems to rely on rapid contextual interaction with the literal interpretation assigned to sentences. The experimental evidence suggests that the logical form of scalars is initially computed and altered pragmatically only when contextually required. The former, by contrast seem to be interpreted at the outset by some version of standardization. Non-standarized interpretation is assigned only at cost. What explains this difference? We think the answer lies in the same issues we 37 See Bach and Harnish (1979, 7) , the 'Linguistic Presumption'. 38 See Harnish (1983, 341) . 39 Harnish (1983, 341) . 40 Recanati (2004, chapter 2) suggests that all utterance interpretation involves filling out "schemata", which like frames and scripts, have so far resisted theoretical precision regarding individuation and operation. 41 See Clark and Marshall (1981) for a provocative sketch, which applies to more than just definite reference.
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have just been discussing regarding standardization. It lies in the limited range of interpretive options that are associated with Q phenomena as compared with the potentially unbounded appeal to background knowledge characteristic of I phenomena. The computational solutions differ for the two cases. Q phenomena adjustments are rapid. But, barring some special treatment, I phenomena adjustments are slow. Standarization is a response to that exigency, but it comes at a cost.
Available I-Phenomena experiments (viz., studies of impliciture processing) are limited, but the evidence suggests a substantial slowdown in processing is associated with the cancellation of an impliciture. That evidence, however, does not permit strong locality claims. The measures used are not tied to specific loci in the test sentences with sufficient precision to decisively adjudicate between models, though the B&C evidence does suggest effects during reading of the implicitures. Future research will be necessary to test the robustness of the results and to tie processing more immediately to the relevant content elements in implicitures. But, Q-Phenomena claims have a more developed foundation for evaluation. The first question (locality) has some answers in terms of several experiments that used experimental measures common in psycholinguistic studies of lexical and syntactic processing (e.g., self-paced reading, eye-movements in reading, free field gaze measurements for spoken language comprehension, and electrophysiological measures). The measures permit relevant processing comparisons and provide a foundation for more detailed claims. Summary statements are always a bit chancy, but looking across different experiments, the evidence seems best fit to the view that although there is a rapid deployment of the scalar inference, basic sentence processing precedes the application of the interpretation associated with the scalar. Further, available evidence indicates there is a cost associated with the application of the scalar, though the precise nature of this remains to be established. In these regards, scalar processing may contrast with that for the types of implicitures in the B&C and G&H work, though that possibility remains to be experimentally evaluated. Such details of the cost accounting associated with the processing of different instances of impliciture would add dimension to the evaluation of context driven, default and standardization accounts of these cases and eventually to an empirically driven basis for location in the larger space of UEC phenomena. .
